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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1914, at 1:00 PM, Martha, the last known living
passenger pigeon in the world, died at the Cincinnati Zoological Garden at
the age of 29.1 Following a fifty-year unbridled massacre of passenger
pigeons in the United States during the latter half of the nineteenth
century, Martha was the sole living passenger pigeon in 1914.2 The
passenger pigeon was once the most common bird in North America3—
and perhaps the world—occupying a well-established place in the
American avian landscape. Indeed, the passenger pigeon population had
grown to such great numbers in North America that experts predicted
extinction of the passenger pigeon was an impossible proposition—a far
cry from the grim reality the pigeon faced in the early 1900s.
The passenger pigeon was a remarkable animal. The pigeon was able to
achieve significant speed due to its aerodynamic anatomy that helped ease
its long annual migratory journey.4 Each year the passenger pigeon would
migrate from eastern Canada to the southern United States, including the
Texas uplands.5 Unlike other species of migratory birds, passenger
pigeons migrated in enormous groups, often nesting together in such great
1. The Passenger Pigeon, SMITHSONIAN, https://www.si.edu/spotlight/passenger-pigeon
[https://perma.cc/EE9M-Z8Z4]. The last passenger pigeon was named after First Lady Martha
Washington. Id. After Martha’s death, the pigeon was frozen and ultimately taxidermied for
preservation by the Smithsonian Institute. Henry Nicholls, 2014: The Year of the Passenger Pigeon,
(Jan. 13
2014,
2:03 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/animalGUARDIAN
magic/2014/jan/13/2014-martha-passenger-pigeon [https://perma.cc/AH5W-XBSQ].
2. The Passenger Pigeon, supra note 1.
3. Nicholls, supra note 1. It was estimated that at its peak population in the nineteenth
century, the total population of the passenger pigeon was estimated to be just under four billion
individual birds, though exact population numbers are difficult to estimate. Id.
4. Passenger Pigeon, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/spe
cies/birds/passenger_pigeon/natural_history.html [https://perma.cc/276J-C3Q2]. The top speed
of the passenger pigeon is estimated to have been around sixty miles per hour. Nicholls, supra note 1.
5. The Passenger Pigeon, supra note 1.
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numbers that the trees where the nests were located began to lose their
limbs as a result of the number of pigeons occupying a nesting area.6 This
large-group preference of the passenger pigeon was also essential to their
reproductive process. Passenger pigeons mated in large groups and were
incapable of sustaining their population with only a few birds, which
contributed to their ultimate extinction.7
Passenger pigeons faced a difficult environment in the mid-nineteenth
century. Consumption of the passenger pigeon’s meat became popular in
the United States and American hunters capitalized on the consumer’s
demand for the birds.8 Hunters exhausted the population throughout the
latter half of the nineteenth century, and by the time regulatory measures
were put into place to protect the pigeon, it was too late—the bird was on
an irreversible path to extinction.9
The loss of the passenger pigeon to the American avian landscape is a
grim example of how poaching and the unregulated taking of migratory
birds poses a serious threat to our country’s beautiful and diverse wildlife
population. The passenger pigeon not only occupied an important place
in the North American ecosystem, the bird was a magnificent creature and
many early bird observers hailed it as one of the most beautiful avian
figures in nature.10 A nineteenth century Potawatomi tribal leader, Simon
Pokagon, recalled watching the migratory patterns of the passenger
6. Id.
In the winter the birds established “roosting” sites in the forests of the southern states. Each
“roost” often had such tremendous numbers of birds so crowded and massed together that they
frequently broke the limbs of the trees by their weight. In the morning the birds flew out in
large flocks scouring the countryside for food. At night they returned to the roosting area.
Their scolding and chattering as they settled down for the night could be heard for miles.
Id.
7. See id. (explaining how the large flock size initially brought safety from natural predators,
but ultimately made an easy target for human hunters).
8. Id. It is estimated that during a five-month period in 1878, 50,000 passenger pigeons were
killed each day in Petoskey, Michigan. Id.
9. Id. In response to the massacre of passenger pigeons in Michigan in 1878, the Michigan
legislature passed a bill in 1897 limiting the season for hunting passenger pigeons, but the bill had no
meaningful effect on preserving the passenger pigeon populations. Id. By the 1890s, the population
was hunted to the point of near extinction. Id.
10. Cf. Adrian Barnett, Beautiful but Doomed: Demise of the Passenger Pigeon, NEW SCIENTIST
(Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329841-000-beautiful-but-doomeddemise-of-the-passenger-pigeon/ [https://perma.cc/Z882-226D] (reporting on the 100th
anniversary of the last passenger pigeon’s death being marked with the publication of three different
books about the species).
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pigeon: “I have stood by the grandest waterfall of America . . . yet never
have my astonishment, wonder, and admiration been so stirred as when I
witnessed these birds drop from their course like meteors from heaven.”11
The passenger pigeon’s extinction represents one aggravating factor that
spurred calls for the U.S. federal government’s entry into bird
conservation.
Two years after the death of the last passenger pigeon, the United States
took a definitive step toward a more aggressive migratory bird
conservation policy; the United States and Great Britain entered into a
treaty to protect migratory birds across North America.12 The treaty led
the U.S. Congress to pass the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”) in
191813—a statute aimed squarely at protecting precious avian migratory
species that provide important diversity to our country’s ecosystem—such
as the passenger pigeon—from human predators.14 Notwithstanding its
venerable status as the first major bird conservation law in the United
States, recent interpretations of the statute’s criminal liability reveal a split
among the U.S. courts of appeals.15
Perhaps the most significant, and certainly the most litigated,16
provision of the MBTA imposes criminal liability on any individual or

11. Barry Yeoman, Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, AUDUBON (May–June
2014),
http://www.audubon.org/magazine/may-june-2014/why-passenger-pigeon-went-extinct
[https://perma.cc/VZ5L-LCAZ].
12. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds in the United States and Canada, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 [hereinafter
Migratory Bird Treaty].
13. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012); see Migratory Bird Treaty
Centennial 1916–2016, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/birds/MBTreaty
100/index.php [https://perma.cc/3KPW-E28X] (“[T]he Convention between the United States and
Great Britain (for Canada) for the Protection of Migratory Birds [is] also called the Migratory Bird
Treaty . . . .”).
14. 100 Years of Nest Protection, NEST WATCH, http://nestwatch.org/connect/news/
celebrating-100-years-of-nest-protection/ [https://perma.cc/76AW-66ZT].
15. See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488–89 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A]
‘taking’ is limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds. [This]
conclusion is based on the statute’s text, its common law origin, a comparison with other relevant
statutes, and rejection of the argument that strict liability can change the nature of the necessary
illegal act.”). But see United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010) (“As a
matter of statutory construction, the ‘take’ provision of the [Migratory Bird Treaty] Act does not
contain a scienter requirement.”).
16. According to a Westlaw case search, § 703 of the MBTA—the section of the MBTA that
makes it illegal to take, kill or possess a migratory bird—has been cited in 470 federal cases since
June 4, 1919. WESTLAW, https://next.westlaw.com (locate the Migratory Bird Treaty Act § 703; then
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entity that “takes”—another word for kills—a migratory bird protected
under the statute.17 Interpreting the “take” provision in the MBTA
caused a recent division among the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits.18 Determining whether an individual or entity has
committed such a take varies depending in which U.S. circuit the case
arises.19
The conceptual cause of this division is whether the MBTA imposes
strict liability for incidental takes of migratory birds or whether mens rea is
required to sustain a conviction for a take.20 This particular dispute over
the mental state requirement in the MBTA led the Executive Branch of
the U.S. government to assume vastly different approaches to prosecutions
brought under the MBTA. The circuit court splits discussed in this
Comment arose primarily under the Obama Administration, which

click “Citing References” tab; then click “Cases” tab; and then select “Federal” under the
“Jurisdiction” category).
17. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (codifying as unlawful actual or attempted pursuit, hunting, taking,
capturing, or killing of migratory birds encompassed by the Act).
18. Compare CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 492 (stating the MBTA’s use of “take” refers
to an action that is done knowingly, not an involuntary action), and Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a strict liability of the MBTA would
“stretch [the] statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal
prohibition on conduct”), and Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991)
(determining Congress explicitly chose to limit the MBTA’s criminal liability to intentional actions
that cause the death of migratory birds, and, thus, the statute should be read without a strict liability
component), with Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 686 (finding, although the MBTA does not
explicitly contain mens rea language, “its ‘plain language’—an indicia of legislative intent—support[s]
a strict liability interpretation”), and United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978)
(holding the MBTA is a strict liability statute and should be construed as such in questions of what
criminal liability the MBTA imposes).
19. Compare Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 686 (holding misdemeanor convictions under the
MBTA are strict liability offenses and do not need an intent requirement), and FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at
908 (finding the taking of migratory birds under the MBTA is a strict liability offense and no intent is
required), with CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 492 (ruling “the MBTA’s ban on ‘takings’ only
prohibits intentional acts (not omissions) that directly (not indirectly or accidentally) kill migratory
birds”), and Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 115 (holding violations of the MBTA require
intent, and, therefore, the statute does not impose strict criminal liability on actions that indirectly
cause migratory bird deaths).
20. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 303 (“We are not free to give words a different
meaning than that which Congress and the Agencies charged with implementing congressional
directives have historically given them under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered
Species Act.”). But see FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908 (holding “the statute does not include as an
element of the offense ‘willfully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently’;” thus, strict liability can be
extended when a defendant incidentally caused the death of an MBTA-protected migratory bird).
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interpreted the MBTA to impose criminal liability for incidental takes.21
The Trump Administration changed course, issuing its own directive and
committing to not prosecute companies for incidental takes.22 These
dueling approaches underscore the need for clarity in courts’ interpretation
of the MBTA—an approach that leaves the disposition of incidental take
cases at the mercy of ever-changing political winds is not sustainable.
Whatever the final equilibrium point is, it is important some level of
judicial certainty exists in this area of the law for both bird conservation
efforts and the operations of the many industries coexisting with the
habitats of our migratory bird populations.23
This Comment examines the MBTA’s imposition of criminal liability on
individuals and entities that “take” protected migratory birds. Part II
provides a history of bird conservation in the United States and the
relevant legislative responses; Part III examines the key cases that created
the circuit split on the issue; Part IV discusses three primary arguments
against a strict liability reading of the MBTA; and Part V summarizes this
Comment’s argument that the MBTA should be read to require mens rea
intent to sustain a conviction, which is consonant with the common law
interpretation of a taking.
II. HISTORY OF AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVATION
A. Early Bird Conservation Efforts in the United States
The road to the eventual passage of the MBTA and other federal
legislation protecting migratory birds was paved largely by private and
non-profit efforts to raise awareness of the need for a comprehensive
approach to avian conservation that included both governmental and
private players. Thus, a discussion on the MBTA, its history, and its
21. See, e.g., Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 686 (finding the take provision of the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act extends to incidental takings).
22. See Juliet Eilperin, Trump Administration Eases Rule Against Killing Birds,
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administrationeases-rule-against-killing-birds/2017/12/26/1be9afe6-ea72-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.html?utm
_term=.55507c6561e2 [https://perma.cc/8M9S-R2LT] (“The Interior Department has quietly rolled
back an Obama-era policy aimed at protecting migratory birds, stating . . . it will no longer prosecute
oil and gas, wind, and solar operators that accidentally kill birds.”).
23. See generally Tina M. Smith, Comment, Wildlife Protection and Off-Shore Drilling: Can There Be a
Balance Between the Two?, 6 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 349, 382 (2011) (discussing the challenges that exist
between offshore drilling and the conservation of migratory birds and other wildlife; specifically
stating, “Wildlife and off-shore drilling do not complement each other”).
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interpretation in modern America, must be framed by an examination of
the private American conservation efforts that were ultimately buttressed
by federal legislation.
The United States has sought to preserve its wildlife—specifically, the
migratory bird populations—for over 100 years.24 Efforts within the
conservation community to protect migratory birds and preserve their
habitats in the United States date back to the late nineteenth century—
marked most notably by the creation of the National Audubon Society.25
The Society was born in Massachusetts, where the organization’s
progenitors—Harriet Hemmingway and Mina Hal—established the first
chapter of this prominent national organization.26
The chief work of the Audubon Society today is to advance the
protection of migratory and other wild birds in the United States.27 The
National Audubon Society founders developed the formal bird
conservation organization in response to the widespread killing of
migratory birds that fueled the rapid growth of the millinery and plume
trade in the late 1800s.28 The Society’s work in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries laid the foundation for a major bird conservation
movement in the United States, which ultimately led to the passage of
federal legislation aimed specifically at the protection of migratory avian
species.29
24. See The Evolution of the Conservation Movement, 1850–1920, LIBR. CONG.,
http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/connections/conservation/history.html [https://
perma.cc/2U8V-XLPL] (“Explorers of the American frontier brought back beautiful images of wild
lands. When citizens saw these pictures of the nation’s wilderness, they began to appreciate and
value our country’s natural wonders.”).
25. History
of
Audubon
and
Science-Based
Bird
Conservation,
AUDUBON,
http://www.audubon.org/content/history-audubon-and-waterbird-conservation [https://perma.cc/
SFX4-BZVR].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Women’s hats made from real bird feathers became a fashion symbol in Europe and
eventually in the United States in the second-half of the eighteenth century. Linton Weeks, Hats Off
to Women Who Saved the Birds, NPR (July 15, 2015, 9:33 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/nprhistory-dept/2015/07/15/422860307/hats-off-to-women-who-saved-the-birds [https://perma.cc/
4ZA4-6635]. These hats were fashioned from pheasants and other migratory bird feathers. Id. The
millinery trade and plume trade are terms that refer to the market in which bird feathers, wings, and
whole birds were harvested and sold for fashion purposes. Cf. id. (“Dense bird colonies were being
wiped out in Florida so that women of the ‘private carriage crowd’ could make a fashion statement
by shopping for aigrettes.”). Some figures suggest that upwards of five million North American birds
were killed annually. Id.
29. History of Audubon and Science-Based Bird Conservation, supra note 25.
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Following its inception in 1905, the Audubon Society realized that, in
order for meaningful bird conservation to become a reality in the United
States, the organization needed to engage in direct lobbying efforts to
secure the passage of legislation at both the state and federal levels that
would protect endangered and migratory bird populations in the United
States.30 William Dutcher—the first president of the National Audubon
Association—said at the Society’s inaugural meeting: “The object of the
organization is to be a barrier between wild birds and animals and a very
large unthinking class, and a smaller but more harmful class of selfish
people.”31 This comment from the organization’s president in the early
1900s foreshadowed an issue that persists today: how to handle both the
intentional and unintentional killing of rare migratory birds.
The first formal U.S. Government bird conservation efforts also date
back to the early 1990s.32 In 1903, an island near Florida received the first
ever National Wildlife Refuge designation from the U.S. government.33
This designation marked a significant turning point in the bird
conservation movement because, for the first time, the U.S. Government
recognized the need to further regulate migratory birds in order to ensure
30. Records from the National Audubon Society (1883–1991), in NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY
RECORDS, MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVES DIVISION, THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY, iii (Valerie
Wingfield ed., 2011), http://archives.nypl.org/uploads/collection/pdf_finding_aid/mss2099.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6T8-R623].
31. Id. (quoting former Audubon National Association President William Dutcher at the
Audubon Society’s first annual meeting). Dutcher led the Audubon Society into significant battles at
the New York State Legislature, which ultimately led to the passage of the “Audubon Plumage Bill”
in 1910. Id.; see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0917 (McKinney 2012) (prohibiting the sale
of native bird feathers). This important state legislation took significant steps toward combatting the
growing and troubling trend of exploiting migratory birds for commercial purposes in New York
State. Despite the legislative action, the exploitation of birds for the sale of their feathers perpetuated
in the state of New York. See Adee Braun, Fine-Feathered Friends, LAPHAM’S Q. (June 28, 2013),
http://www.laphamsquarterly.org/roundtable/fine-feathered-friends [https://perma.cc/V6BE-7P2
M] (arguing that despite the Audubon Society’s efforts—and ultimately the New York State
Legislature’s action on the issue—prices for wild bird feathers continued to rise as a result of the
fashion industry’s demand for goods created from migratory birds).
32. History of the United States Endangered Species Act, U. OF FLA.: FLA. MUSEUM OF
NAT. HIST., https://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/discover/general-topics/about-esa [https://perma.cc/
W595-FGSP].
33. See generally U.S. NABCI COMM., THE NORTH AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVATION
INITIATIVE IN THE UNITED STATES: A VISION OF AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVATION 10 (2000)
(noting the designation of the first National Wildlife Refuge in Florida marked “an important point in
the history of bird conservation”). The eight-acre island near the Floridian coast received the
NWR designation “to protect pelicans and other colonial nesting birds from the excessive millinery
trade.” Id.
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the protection of these important species.34 The National Wildlife Refuge
System continues today as a successful method for protecting avian species
in the United States.35 Currently, there are over 560 National Wildlife
Refuges across the country accounting for over 150 million acres of
protected land.36
Discussions continue today on how to properly balance government
regulations protecting migratory birds with private enterprise needs.37
The issue even received the attention of President Donald J. Trump, who
mentioned the threat wind turbines pose to migratory birds during a
November 22, 2016, interview with the New York Times.38 This
discussion, which was raised during a conversation on United States
energy diversity, underscores the important role that the U.S. Government
plays in providing a consistent and accurate application of the MBTA.
34. Id.
35. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE SYS., AMERICA’S NATIONAL
WILDLIFE REFUGES (2007) (describing the work of the Department of the Interior’s Wildlife Refuge
System as “one of America’s greatest conservation success stories,” and further recognizing that the
Refuge System developed under President Theodore Roosevelt has “helped save [the United States’]
national symbol, the American bald eagle, from extinction and has protected hundreds of other wild
species—including—fish, migratory birds, and many other plants and animals”).
36. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE SYS. HEADQUARTERS,
MEET THE NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM 4 (2015), https://www.fws.gov/refuges/vision/pdfs/
MeetTheNWRSMar2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK83-QM54].
37. See, e.g., Monica Antonio, Dangers of Wind Energy: Wind Turbines Deadly to Golden Eagles,
Migratory Birds, NATURE WORLD NEWS (Oct. 8, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://www.natureworldnews.
com/articles/29857/20161008/dangers-wind-energy-turbines-deadly-golden-eagles-migratory-birds.
htm [https://perma.cc/PV3A-2P67 ] (citing a new study examining wind turbines’ effect on eagles—
a bird species protected under the MBTA—and specifically noting eagles are especially susceptible to
collisions with spinning wind turbines due to their unique flight habits and tendencies).
38. See Donald Trump’s New York Times Interview: Full Transcript, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/us/politics/trump-new-york-times-interview-transcript.html
?_r=0 [[https://perma.cc/7Q3A-HPC5] ] (providing a transcript of President Trump’s full interview
with the New York Times, which occurred shortly after his election). In his interview with the New
York Times, then President-Elect Trump expressed concern about the death of migratory birds
stemming from the rise in wind energy production. Id. Trump stated, “The windmills are
devastating to the bird population.” Id. President Trump’s discussion about the death of migratory
birds in the context of wind energy production underscores the significance and timeliness of the
challenge to regulate the taking of migratory birds in the midst of the growing energy demand and
production. See also Philip Bump, There’s a Lot to Unpack in Just One of Donald Trump’s Answers About
Energy Policy, WASH. POST (May 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/05/26/theres-a-lot-to-unpack-in-donald-trumps-answers-about-energy-policy/ [https:
//perma.cc/U4NW-JGFR] (reporting during one of President Trump’s presidential campaign stops
in North Dakota, then-Candidate Trump stated, “[I]f you go to various places in California, wind is
killing all of the eagles. . . . [O]ne of the most treasured birds—and they’re killing them by the
hundreds and nothing happens”).
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B. Legislative Measures to Protect Migratory Birds
Following the mobilization of private groups in support of increased
awareness and action to protect migratory bird populations, the U.S.
Government responded with its own contribution to the growing
conservation movement at the beginning of the twentieth century.39 The
Audubon Society’s efforts on bird conservation contributed to the
Congress’s eventual enactment of legislation that protected migratory and
endangered avian species.40 The Congress’s response to the bird
conservation effort came in two forms: (1) The passage of the MBTA in
1918;41 and (2) The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”).42 The
passage of the MBTA and ESA illustrate Congress’s attention to the
migratory bird issue and its acknowledgment of the need to protect our
country’s precious avian wildlife.43 Federal legislation also, at least to a
certain extent, provided some clarity for companies and individuals that
engage in activities affecting avian wildlife.
Ultimately, the enactment of the MBTA and the ESA created complex
regulatory schemes housed primarily in the U.S. Department of the
Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency.44 Since the passage of
the MBTA and ESA, federal regulators continue to face the challenge of
39. See Migratory Bird Treaty, supra note 12, at 1702 (declaring the U.S. government’s
commitment to a joint international effort to ensure the protection of migratory bird species).
40. Records from the National Audubon Society (1883–1991), supra note 30, at ii (“The Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918 between the U.S. and Canada, which incorporated the provisions of the
Weeks-McLean Bill, was also passed in large measure through [the] lobbying efforts [of the Audubon
movement].”).
41. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
42. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012) (creating a statutory
protection for certain endangered species in the United States).
43. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 1959 (1914) (establishing an island reservation to protect native
birds in Washington State). President Woodrow Wilson issued this executive order in 1914, making
it “unlawful for any person to hunt, trap, capture, willfully disturb or kill any bird of any kind” on the
reservation. Id. This executive order demonstrated President Wilson’s commitment to the
preservation of wild bird populations in the United States four years before the passage of the
MBTA. Id. President Wilson would go on to sign the MBTA into law in 1918. NAT’L AUDUBON
SOC’Y, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Explained, AUDUBON (Jan. 26, 2018),
http://www.audubon.org/news/the-migratory-bird-treaty-act-explained [https://perma.cc/J7YGS3A4].
44. Compare 16 U.S.C § 703(a) (declaring it unlawful to take or kill any migratory bird), with
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (authorizing federal departments and agencies to enforce the policy of protecting
endangered and threatened species), and Kris Dighe & Lana Pettus, Environmental Justice in the Context
of Environmental Crimes, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., July 2011, at 3, 7 (listing the agencies responsible for
enforcing federal environmental legislation and regulations).
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determining the best way to carry out the Congress’s intent, while also
adapting to a changing wildlife environment and growing threats to
migratory birds.45
1.

The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)

The Congress passed the MBTA in 1918 to protect certain migratory
bird species that move through the United States in their migratory
patterns.46 The Act codified a 1916 treaty between the United States and
Great Britain (then acting on behalf of Canada, a territory of Great Britain)
established to protect migratory birds across North America.47
The MBTA’s primary purpose is to protect migratory birds in North
America—hopefully well before the species face the possibility of
extinction—by making it a federal crime “to pursue, hunt, take, capture,
kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to
barter, barter, offer to purchase, [or] purchase” a migratory bird covered
under the MBTA.48 The species covered under the MBTA are found in
separate treaties: (1) The Canadian Convention of 1916; (2) The Mexican
Convention of 1936; (3) The Japanese Convention of 1972; and (4) The
Russian Convention of 1976.49 Altogether, the four treaties lists a total of
1,026 protected avian species.50 The MBTA provides statutory protection
45. See Helen Briggs, Migratory Birds “Lack World Protection”, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-34985273
[https://perma.cc/38PF2WYW] (discussing the significant dangers migratory birds face across the world, and also noting a
recent study that found “[m]ore than 90% of migratory birds are poorly protected on their marathon
journeys around the world”); see also Rachael Bale & Jani Actman, How Wildlife May Fare Under Trump,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 21, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/11/wildlifewatch-trump-wildlife-trafficking-animal-conservation/ [https://perma.cc/8UAL-B5LJ] (examining
the effect that President Trump’s energy policy could have on migratory bird populations, specifically
arguing that the new president’s drilling proposals “could degrade habitats and disrupt migratory
pathways of native species”).
46. See Migratory Bird Treaty, supra note 12, at 1702 (stating migratory birds “traverse certain
parts of the United States and the Dominion of Canada” during their migratory flight paths). This
statement appeared in the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, which created the
purpose the MBTA was drafted to achieve.
47. Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/migtrea.html [https://perma.cc/3ESXG6UF].
48. 16 U.S.C. § 703.
49. Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Birds Protected, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/migratory-bird-treaty-act.php
[https://perma.cc/5FCX-SVGQ].
50. List of Migratory Birds, 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2015).
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for these birds by imposing criminal penalties on persons—and
companies—who fail to comply with the protections provided to all
covered species.51
The varied criminal penalties available under the MBTA have recently
become the source of judicial dispute regarding the scope of liability the
statute imposes.52 Criminal enforcement powers under the MBTA rest
with federal investigators and U.S. Attorneys.53 The U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service (USFWS)—a federal agency within the Department of the
Interior—oversees the protection of migratory birds under the MBTA and
other congressionally-enacted laws protecting avian species.54 The
USFWS possesses the investigative authority to review alleged criminal
violations of the MBTA and conducts preliminary inquiries before turning
meritorious cases over to a U.S. Attorney for prosecution.55
The MBTA criminal penalties accrue if “any person, association,
partnership, or corporation . . . violate[s] any provisions of [the MBTA]”
with the exception of violations that deal with the sale and bartering of
migratory birds.56 The statute imposes both misdemeanor and felony
criminal liability for those individuals or entities convicted of an MBTA
offense.57 Section 707 imposes misdemeanor liability for almost all
MBTA offenses, with penalties not to exceed $15,000 and six months in
prison, or a combination of the two.58 If a person knowingly takes a
migratory bird with the intent to sell or barter the bird, the person may be
charged with a felony; the prison time for such violations could extend to
51. Section 703 of the MBTA makes it a crime “to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, [or]
purchase” a migratory bird. 16 U.S.C. § 703.
52. See id. § 707(a) (making general violations of the MBTA misdemeanor offenses with fines
not to exceed $15,000 and prison time not to exceed six months); see also id. § 707(b) (raising the
crime for MBTA violations to a felony when the defendant knowingly killed a migratory bird with
the intent to traffic or barter the bird).
53. See Dighe & Pettus, supra note 44, at 3, 7 (discussing the U.S. Fish and Wildlife’s
responsibility to respond to and investigate allegations of MBTA violations).
54. About the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/help/about_us.html [https://perma.cc/Z624-FPRY].
55. See Dighe & Pettus, supra note 44, at 3, 7 (“Criminal environmental cases are identified or
generated in a number of different ways and through a variety of agencies, including the EPA [and]
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service . . . . [A]gency regulatory personnel discover violations in the
course of conducting regular inspections and determine upon review that the violations are
criminal.”).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
57. Id. § 707.
58. Id. § 707(a).
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two years.59 While there have been efforts to expand felony liability to all
MBTA violations, most offenses today remain categorized as
misdemeanors.60
Section 707(b) is the only part of the MBTA that requires intent:
“Whoever, in violation of [the MBTA] . . . knowingly take by any manner
whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell, offer to sell, barter or
offer to barter such bird . . . shall be fined not more than $2,000 or
imprisoned . . . .”61 This provision also increases the penalty to a felony
for those who kill migratory birds with the intent to traffic the birds.62
Unlike in other sections of the MBTA where there is no mention of a
mental state associated with the offense, Section 707(b) contains specific
intent language reflective of the public policy interest against migratory
bird trafficking.63 The absence of specific intent language in other
sections of the MBTA, however, does not mean those sections should be
construed as strict liability misdemeanor offenses.64 The language
describing MBTA offenses insinuates intent—e.g., “pursue, hunt, take,
capture, kill[.]”65 Thus, the lack of intent language in Section 707(a)—the
section describing the elements of the misdemeanor MBTA offense—does
59. Id. § 707(b).
60. Congressman DeFazio Introduces Bill to Make Intentional Killing of Protected Birds a Felony,
AUDUBON SOC’Y PORTLAND, http://audubonportland.org/issues/mbta [https://perma.cc/WCY643WW]. Congressman DeFazio’s proposed amendment to the MBTA would have made it a felony
for any intentional killing of a migratory bird protected under the MBTA. Id. In doing so, the
amendment would have also added explicit intent language into the general description of a taking in
the MBTA—language that is notably absent from the current statute.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b).
62. Section 707(b) of the MBTA contains the felony qualification for violations of the statute:
Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly—
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell, offer to sell, barter
or offer to barter such bird, or
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall be guilty of a felony
and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
63. See United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553, 1566 n.17 (D.N.M. 1996), aff’d, 119 F.3d
796 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting Congress amended the MBTA in 1986 to specifically add the knowledge
requirement only for cases that deal with the taking of migratory birds for the purpose of trafficking
the birds).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a); cf. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. at 1566 n.17 (“However, this amendment [to
Section 707(b)] did not affect [S]ection 707(a) which makes the unlawful possession of feathers a
misdemeanor offense.”).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 4, Art. 4

850

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:837

not imply that all other offenses, excluding those dealing with violations
regarding migratory bird trafficking, should be read as strict liability
misdemeanor offenses.66 The lack of specific intent language in
significant portions of the MBTA has led to judicial confusion on this
point.
2.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA)

The U.S. Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in
December of 1973.67 The Congress’s goal in crafting the ESA was to
protect fish, plants, and other wildlife that had become “so depleted in
numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction . . . .”68
The Congress believed the United States had a duty to the broader
international community “to conserve to the extent practicable the various
species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction.”69
The purpose of the ESA is to bring listed endangered species back from
the brink of extinction by criminalizing the killing of such species and
protecting the habitats and ecosystems that are essential for their
survival.70 The Congress recognized that endangered species—such as
birds and fish—play an important role in education and recreation in the
United States, and it is not only important to protect the animals and
plants themselves, but also their habitats.71
The protection of avian habitats is the primary area where the MBTA
and the ESA part ways in terms of the actions each statute covers.
Specifically, the ESA makes it a crime to harm or harass a species
protected under the statute, while the MBTA only makes it a crime to
“take” and “kill” protected birds.72 The distinct language found in the
66. Id. § 707(a).
67. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
68. Id. § 1531(a).
69. Id.
70. See id. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and]
to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species . . . .”).
71. See History of the United States Endangered Species Act, supra note 32 (underscoring the need for
the ESA in the early 1970s because the Congress viewed endangered species “as valuable educational,
scientific, recreational, historical and esthetical” resources). The ESA placed the responsibility of
enforcing its new measures on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—responsible for freshwater animals
and migratory birds—and the National Marine Fisheries Service—responsible for enforcing the ESA
provisions dealing with animals that live in the ocean or other marine environments. Id.
72. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (defining the taking of a protected species as “to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
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ESA and MBTA suggests that the Congress had two separate and unique
purposes when it passed the separate acts. While the ESA and MBTA
certainly share in a similar mission—the conservation of threatened
species in North America—the two statutes target importantly different
actions directed toward migratory birds and other wildlife. The ESA’s
broad prohibition on harming avian habitats and the MBTA’s narrower
focus on criminal liability for targeting individual birds, support a narrow
reading of the MBTA.73 The ESA—with its broader prohibition on
interference with avian habitats—thus stands as an important guidepost
for the proper reading of the MBTA within the migratory bird legislative
landscape.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT IN CASES INTERPRETING THE MBTA
The proper interpretation of what criminal culpability the MBTA
requires—and specifically, whether intent is required for a conviction
under the MBTA—is the subject of much judicial debate.74 At the core
of this debate is whether the MBTA’s general prohibition on the “taking”
of a migratory bird should be construed as a strict liability offense, or
whether a defendant must act affirmatively and intentionally to kill a
migratory bird to accrue liability.75 The issue of intent is straightforward
in cases involving individuals who intentionally kill migratory birds.
Hunters accused of violating the MBTA, for example, are generally aware
that they are shooting at a bird and take the affirmative act to kill a
protected avian species.
The importance of intent becomes challenging in situations where
ordinary business practices cause the death of migratory birds protected
under the Act. In this category of a “take,” the defendant might argue a
lack of intent to harm migratory birds, and, thus, a criminal conviction
conduct”), with Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012) (making it a crime “to pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] attempt to take, capture, or kill” a migratory bird protected under the
MBTA).
73. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302–03 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing the
difference in criminal liability found in the ESA and the MBTA, and arguing the ESA uses language
that purposefully broadens criminal liability for actors that take migratory birds beyond the liability
found in the MBTA).
74. See generally Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a Solution: Incidental Taking Under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 16 (2013) (“Federal judges have struggled
with the question of whether to apply the MBTA to incidental taking and, if so applied, determining
the scope of prohibited activity.”).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 704.
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under the MBTA would be inappropriate.76 A significant portion of these
cases concern energy companies—specifically, oil and gas companies—
whose activities include the extraction and production of fossil fuels that
often affect migratory birds.77 These cases created a split among the U.S.
76. See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2015)
(determining a conviction under the MBTA cannot be upheld absent an intentional act to harm
migratory birds). The defendant, CITGO Petroleum, argued that because it never had any intent to
harm migratory birds protected under the MTBA—the birds merely flew into oil equalization tanks
the company owned—it lacked any intent to harm the birds, and took no affirmative action aimed at
killing or capturing migratory birds. Id.
77. See Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Principal Deputy Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, to Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior 13 (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/m-37050.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PE9-FHW5]
(discussing the prosecution of energy companies for incidentally causing the deaths of migratory
birds and the conflicting decisions reached by circuit courts in deciding “incidental take” cases).
There is a trend in recent years to resolve the split among the circuits on the proper interpretation of
the MBTA through a regulatory rulemaking process by the introduction of an incidental taking
permit program within the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. See Benjamin Pachito, Note, Resolving the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act Circuit Split: Support for a Strict Liability Standard and Proposal for an Incidental
Take Permit, J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L., Winter 2016, at 62 (advocating for the resolution of the circuit
split by implementing a strict liability standard for unintentional MBTA violations, coupled with “an
‘incidental take’ permit scheme . . . to temper the scope of a strict liability approach”). If such a
program were to be successfully enacted, it could provide some relief in the form of certainty for
companies engaged in activities that lead to the incidental taking of migratory birds, but such a
program would not resolve the split on the proper legal interpretation that persists among the U.S.
courts of appeals. See generally Benjamin Hanelin et al., US Fish & Wildlife Service Proposes First-of-itsKind Migratory Bird Incidental Take Authorizations, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (June 2, 2015),
https://www.cleanenergylawreport.com/environmental-and-approvals/us-fish-wildlife-service-prop
oses-first-of-its-kind-migratory-bird-incidental-take-authorizations/ [https://perma.cc/4YJX-YM23]
(explaining the programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service is currently pursuing, which is looking at a new rule within the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
that would provide protection for companies that incidentally take migratory birds protected under
the MBTA); see also Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Notice
of Intent, 80 Fed. Reg. 30032 (May 26, 2015) (providing notice in the Federal Register of the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service’s intent to conduct a PEIS and describing the need for the PEIS). In its
efforts to carry out the enforcement of federal laws that deal with fish and wildlife—such as the
MBTA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service promulgates rules through an administrative process. See,
e.g., id. at 30034 (May 26, 2015) (noting the possible actions the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is
considering to permit incidental take of migratory birds, each of which would require the
promulgation of “new regulations under the MBTA, in compliance with the applicable statutory and
Executive Branch requirements for rulemaking”). To this end, the U.S Fish and Wildlife Service is in
the process of considering a new agency rule that would allow for the issuances of incidental take
permits to entities or individuals that anticipate their activities might result in the incidental taking of
a migratory bird protected under the MBTA. Id. The aim of the proposed incidental take permit is
to provide greater legal certainty to actors who might incidentally take migratory birds by offering
such actors protection from prosecution following their incidental taking of a migratory bird. See id.
(“This regulatory process would provide greater certainty for entities that have taken efforts to
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courts of appeals on whether intent is required to sustain a conviction or
whether the incidental taking of a migratory bird due to a company’s
business actions is sufficient to convict.78 The primary cases elucidating
the circuit split stem from the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits.79
A. Cases Holding Intent Is Required Under the MBTA
One of the most recent federal circuit court opinions dealing with
criminal intent and the MBTA is the September 2015 Fifth Circuit
decision in United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corporation.80 The CITGO
holding separates the two intent elements of criminal offenses—actus reus
and mens rea—and states that even if misdemeanor offenses in the MBTA
dispose of the mens rea requirement, intent to commit the offense is still
required.81 This case indicates that the interpretation of the scope of the

reduce incidental take and significantly benefit bird conservation by promoting implementation of
appropriate conservation measures to avoid or reduce avian mortality.”). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service already provides purposeful take permits—commonly known as migratory bird hunting
permits—for those wishing to purposefully take migratory birds that the federal government allows
based on the populations of those migratory birds. Permit Policies & Regulations, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/permits/permit-policies-andregulations.php [https://perma.cc/EY8G-D8J5] (listing various purposes for which the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service is authorized to issue migratory bird permits, such as falconry, scientific
colleting, and taxidermy). The U.S Fish and Wildlife Service also authorizes the issuance of
incidental take permits under other statutes—such as the Endangered Species Act—but to date, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service does not have a rule allowing for the issuance of incidental take
permits under the MBTA. See Endangered Species Permits, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Apr. 14,
2015), https://www.fws.gov/midwest/Endangered/permits/hcp/index.html [https://perma.cc/
L2J8-E8Q4] (listing available permits under the ESA but not under the MBTA.) The process for
this new incidental take permit has included the completion of the scoping process, the comment
period, and the public meeting period.
See Migratory Bird Permits, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0001 [https://perma.cc/P38
X-RA4C]] (indicating a comment period end date of July 27, 2015, and a publication period of
May 26, 2017).
78. See, e.g., CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 491–92 (rejecting the holding of the Second
and Tenth Circuits that an MBTA conviction can occur even when a defendant incidentally causes
the death of a migratory bird protected under the MBTA).
79. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010); Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
80. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
81. Id. at 492.
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MBTA’s criminal liability remains a litigated issue among the U.S. courts of
appeals.82
The CITGO appeal addressed a conviction for the “taking” of migratory
birds in violation of the MBTA.83 The indictment against CITGO alleged
that migratory birds flew into uncovered CITGO-owned oil equalization
tanks at the company’s Corpus Christi, Texas refinery.84 Texas
environmental inspectors performed a surprise inspection of the oil
equalization tanks and “suspected birds had died in the uncovered
tanks[.]”85 The indictment thus alleged CITGO was responsible for the
deaths of the birds and could be tried under the MBTA.86
The federal district court convicted CITGO on two counts of MBTA
violations based on proof that migratory birds died as a result of the
company’s failure to properly cover the oil equalization tanks.87 CITGO’s
appeal challenged the district court’s interpretation of the MBTA’s
“taking” provision.88 The Fifth Circuit overturned the conviction,
holding that even if misdemeanor crimes under the MBTA are strict

82. See id. at 491–94 (following the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation that only
“intentional acts (not omissions) that directly (not indirectly or accidently) kill migratory birds” can
result in criminal liability under the MBTA).
83. Id. at 480–81.
84. Id. at 480. An oil equalization tank is a large container used in the oil refinement process,
which provides “a way point between the oil-water separators and subsequent treatments” of the oil,
and “ensure[s] that a constant and manageable amount of wastewater flows to secondary treatment
systems.” Id. at 479.
85. Id. at 480.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 480–81. In CITGO, the grand jury returned a ten-count indictment that included
“two counts of knowingly operating [two oil equalization tanks] without emission control devices,”
which the government alleged violated the Clean Air Act (42. U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2012)). See id.
at 480 (stating CITGO’s uncovered oil equalization tanks constituted a violation of Subpart QQQ of
the Clean Air Act). While the Fifth Circuit also considered the convictions under the Clean Air Act
on appeal—and ultimately reversed the district court’s holding—that issue does not pertain to the
incidental taking of migratory birds; rather, it is a completely separate issue, that the Fifth Circuit
considered in an entirely different section of the opinion. Compare id. at 487–88 (explaining Clean Air
Act issue), with id. at 489–91 (explaining taking issue); see also id. at 487–88 (holding Subpart QQQ of
the Clean Air Act “does not regulate equalization tanks” and, as a result, “CITGO’s . . . convictions
must accordingly be reversed”). The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act and the
subsequent reversal of CITGO’s conviction under the act is significant, but it will not be addressed in
this Comment because the general focus here is on the circuit split pertaining to the proper
interpretation of the taking provision found in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, an entirely separate
statute from the Clean Air Act.
88. See id. at 481 (footnote omitted) (“CITGO argues that the MBTA only criminalizes acts
related to hunting or poaching, not omissions that unintentionally kill birds.”).
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liability offenses, the defendant must still take an affirmative act
intentionally aimed at killing migratory birds to be held criminally liable
under the Act.89 The Fifth Circuit thus held CITGO lacked the requisite
actus reus to satisfy the requirements of the MTBA.90 In its holding, the
court stated that in order for a defendant to be liable under the MBTA, the
“defendant must still commit the act to be liable . . . [and] commit the act
voluntarily.”91 The CITGO case thus stands for the proposition that even
if misdemeanor offenses under the MBTA are indeed strict liability
offenses, a voluntary act is still required to sustain a conviction because the
actus reus requirement still remains in a strict liability reading of the
MBTA.92
In the 1991 case of Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans,93 the Ninth Circuit
held that interference with migratory bird habitats fell short of the
threshold required for a “taking” under the MBTA.94 The case stemmed
from the Seattle Audubon Society’s effort to stop the Bureau of Land
Management from allowing timber harvesting in areas that could affect the
northern spotted owl habitat, a bird protected under the MBTA and the
Endangered Species Act.95 The Audubon Society contended that
permitting logging in areas that could contain a northern spotted owl
habitat constituted a taking of the northern spotted owl.96
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Audubon Society’s arguments, holding
that the MBTA and the ESA differ in regards to the criminal liability each
statute imposes.97 The court found that the breadth of criminal liability

89. See id. at 492 (“Accordingly, requiring defendants, as an element of an MBTA
misdemeanor crime, to take an affirmative action to cause migratory bird deaths is consistent with
the imposition of strict liability.”).
90. See id. (defining the MBTA’s actus reus as, “‘[T]o take[,]’ which, even without a mens rea, is
not something that is done unknowingly or involuntarily”).
91. Id.
92. See id. (reconciling the dispensing of a mens rea requirement in the strict liability crime of
“taking” under the MBTA with the retaining of an actus reus requirement that necessitates “an
intentional and deliberate act” in the pursuit of killing migratory birds).
93. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
94. Id. at 302.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 302–03. (distinguishing the MBTA from the ESA on the grounds that the MBTA
“describes physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers . . . [and] conduct which
was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918[,]” while the ESA includes
broader actions such as “harass” and “harm” that are not found in the MBTA). The court also
observed that the Congress amended the MBTA the year after the passage of the ESA, and in those
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under the MBTA does not include actions that harass or harm migratory
birds.98 In its holding, the court acknowledged that other courts choose
to impose strict liability on actors that cause the death of migratory birds
through the inadvertent release of toxic chemicals,99 but distinguished
these cases from those in which the defendant’s actions merely interfered
with migratory bird habitats.100 The Ninth Circuit’s holding does not
eliminate the possibility that certain violations of the MBTA can be
construed as strict liability crimes, such as cases that deal with hunting,
poaching, and other acts that are directed at migratory birds.101 The
court, however, found the destruction of migratory bird habitats
constituted activity that falls outside the scope of the MBTA.102
The Eighth Circuit, in Newton County Wildlife Association v. United States
Forest Service,103 followed the Ninth Circuit in holding the MBTA was
designed to prohibit the actions of poachers and hunters who target
migratory birds—thus, it was inappropriate to extend the MBTA beyond
its narrow purpose in order to hold companies engaged in commercial
activity liable for the unintentional harm caused to migratory birds.104
The Newton County Wildlife Association sought an injunction against
the U.S. Forest Service after the Forest Service approved the sale of timber

amendments the Congress failed to include language that extended the MBTA to the same actions
that the ESA prohibits. Id. at 303.
98. See id. (“Habitat destruction causes ‘harm’ to the owls under the ESA but does not ‘take’
them within the meaning of the MBTA.”).
99. See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding the death of
migratory birds as a result of toxic chemicals released in an open discharge tank constituted a taking
of migratory birds on strict liability grounds).
100. See Evans, 952 F.2d at 303 (“These cases do not suggest that habitat destruction, leading
indirectly to bird deaths, amounts to the ‘taking’ of migratory birds within the meaning of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”).
101. Id. at 302.
102. Id. at 303 (holding “[h]abitat destruction causes ‘harm’ to the owls under the ESA but
does not ‘take’ them within the meaning of the MBTA” and, therefore, the defendant cannot be held
liable for taking migratory birds because it interfered with the birds’ habitat).
103. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).
104. See id. at 115 (construing the word “take” in the MBTA as referring to deliberate actions
taken by hunters and poachers against migratory birds). The Eighth Circuit also rejected the Newton
County Wildlife Association’s plea based on the grounds that the MBTA does not extend to federal
agency actions, such as the U.S. Forest Service’s logging approval under consideration in the case;
however, this is an issue wholly separate from the intent versus strict liability issue that remains at the
center of the split among the circuit courts. Id.
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along the Buffalo River.105 The Wildlife Association argued that the sale
of the timber violated the MBTA because logging causes harm to
migratory bird habitats.106 In its holding, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
notion that the MBTA imposes strict liability for all offenses under the
MBTA.107 The court stated that while “[s]trict liability may be
appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers . . . it would stretch
this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an
absolute criminal prohibition on conduct . . . that indirectly results in the
death of migratory birds.”108 The Eighth Circuit’s holding draws an
important distinction between hunting and poaching activities and
commercial activities, while highlighting the danger of adopting a strict
liability approach to all criminal conduct under the MBTA.109
B. Cases Holding the MBTA Extends to Incidental Takes
In United States v. Apollo Energies, Incorporation110—a case similar to
CITGO—an oil company was convicted of taking migratory birds in
105. See id. at 114 (stating the wildlife association sought an injunction against the United
States Forest Service “on the grounds that the Forest Service failed to obtain an MBTA ‘special
purpose’ permit from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service”).
106. Id. at 115.
107. See id. at 115 (holding that extending a strict liability reading of the MBTA to activities
such as timber harvesting would constitute an extension of the MBTA’s scope beyond the statute’s
stated purpose).
108. See id. (issuing a warning of the dangers associated with taking a strict liability reading of
the statute as it pertains to hunting and poaching, and extending such a reading to all criminal
conduct). The Eighth Circuit drew a significant distinction in its holding on the strict liability
reading. See id. (differentiating between intentional “conduct directed at migratory birds” and
conduct that merely indirectly causes migratory bird fatalities, where application of a strict liability
standard is potentially appropriate in the former but unreasonable in the latter). The court held that a
strict liability reading may very well be appropriate in cases that deal with hunting and poaching—the
very actions the MBTA was designed to prohibit. See id. (perceiving strict liability as suitable in
instances of conduct expressly proscribed by the MBTA, such as hunting migratory birds). For
example, if a hunter aimed his gun at a bird, fired the gun, and killed the bird, but was unware that
the bird was protected, then a strict liability of the hunter’s actions would be appropriate. See, e.g.,
United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 492 (5th Cir. 2015) (“There is no doubt that
a hunter who shoots a migratory bird without a permit in the mistaken belief that it is not a migratory
bird may be strictly liable for a ‘taking’ under the MBTA because he engaged in an intentional and
deliberate act toward the bird.”). The Eighth Circuit contends that such a reading of strict liability
must stop there and cannot be extended under the MBTA’s plain language to an “absolute criminal
prohibition” on activities that may indirectly cause migratory bird deaths. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n,
113 F.3d at 115.
109. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n, 113 F.3d at 115.
110. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
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violation of the MBTA.111 The Apollo case arose after migratory birds
were found dead in a piece of Apollo’s drilling equipment.112 Apollo
Energies was found guilty of one misdemeanor violation of the MBTA
and fined $1,500.113 The Tenth Circuit affirmed Apollo’s conviction,
finding violations under MBTA Section 703 are strict liability offenses that
“do not require [the] defendants [to] knowingly or intentionally violate the
law.”114
Apollo and its co-defendant argued the MBTA lacks a strict liability
component, and further asserted that if, in fact, the MBTA does contain a
strict liability component, the prosecution of Apollo was unconstitutional
under the circumstances.115 A key fact in Apollo’s trial was that, prior to
Apollo’s indictment, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was tipped off to a
widespread problem of migratory birds dying in oilfield drilling
equipment.116
Relying on its holding in the 1997 case of United States v. Corrow,117 the
Tenth Circuit ruled that misdemeanor violations of the MBTA are strict
liability offenses.118 The Tenth Circuit extended its interpretation to
include actions beyond the scope of those found in Corrow.119 The court
concluded that its holding in Corrow was not limited to the type of activity
111. Id. at 682.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. In response to the discovery of the widespread problem of oilfield equipment avian
deaths, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service embarked on an extensive campaign to alert drilling
companies of the dangers drilling equipment pose to migratory birds; the Service provided education
for oil companies on how to combat this problem. Id. at 682–83. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
also provided a grace period for oilfield companies to remedy the dangers to migratory birds in their
drilling equipment. Id. at 683. After the grace period expired, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
searched Apollo’s oilfield equipment and found several deceased MBTA-protected birds. Id. Apollo
argued that despite the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s efforts to educate the industry about the
problem, the company did not intend to kill migratory birds. Id.
117. United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997).
118. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 684–85. The Corrow case dealt with a defendant accused
of the unlawful trafficking of feathers from MBTA-protected birds. See Corrow, 119 F.3d at 805–06
(holding the taking of migratory bird feathers constituted a violation of the MBTA under a strict
liability interpretation). In deciding the case, the Tenth Circuit found that the simple language of the
statute—specifically, “it shall be unlawful”—was sufficient to read strict liability into the statute for
the purposes of criminal liability. Id. at 805. The fact that the defendant was in possession of the
bird feathers was, in the court’s opinion, sufficient evidence to convict the defendant under the plain
language of the MBTA. Id. at 806.
119. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 685.
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the Corrow defendants committed.120 Rather, the Tenth Circuit stated
there was “[n]othing in the structure or logic of the [Corrow] opinion [that]
lends itself to carving out an exception for different types of conduct, and
therefore a scienter requirement for the takings here.”121
The 1978 case of United States v. FMC Corporation122 dealt with the
conviction of a New York pesticide manufacturing company for the
unlawful taking of migratory birds under the MBTA.123 It was alleged in
the indictment that FMC deposited a significant amount of hazardous
chemical waste—a byproduct of FMC’s pesticide manufacturing process—
into an open ten-acre pond in New York.124 The size of the
contaminated pond attracted migratory birds, and as a result, several dead
migratory birds were discovered in the pond.125 Additional dead
migratory birds were later discovered in the wastewater pond and FMC
was eventually indicted on thirty-six counts of taking migratory birds by
the means of toxic water.126
In its defense, FMC raised the argument that there must actually be
intent to kill a migratory bird in order to sustain a conviction for a “taking”
under the MBTA.127 FMC further argued that because the company
lacked any intent to kill the birds that died as a result of the hazardous
waste deposited in the pond, coupled with the fact that FMC did not take
any affirmative action to cause the death of the birds, meant the company
lacked the requisite intent needed to uphold a conviction of taking
migratory birds under the MBTA.128
The Second Circuit disagreed with FMC’s interpretation of the MBTA
with regard to the level of culpability needed for an MBTA conviction.129
Instead, the court found that FMC did in fact “perform an affirmative
act[:] it engaged in the manufacture of a pesticide known to be highly
toxic” and then allowed for the byproduct of the production of this highly

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 903–04.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 906.
Id.
Id. at 907.
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toxic chemical to be deposited into a large pond that attracted migratory
birds.130 As a result, the Second Circuit upheld FMC’s conviction.131
The court reasoned that even though FMC might not have been “aware
of the lethal-to-birds quality of the water in its [wastewater] pond . . .
[FMC] was aware of the danger of carbofuran [(one of the chemicals FMC
used to produce pesticide)] to humans.”132 Because the Second Circuit
found the MBTA does not contain language that implies a scienter
requirement—such as willful, knowing, or reckless—coupled with the
significant public policy arguments toward a strict liability reading of the
statute, the Second Circuit held that the lower court did not err in
convicting FMC for the taking of migratory birds under a strict liability
reading of the MBTA that extends to include incidental takings of
migratory birds.133
The cases above highlight the ongoing struggle in the U.S. courts of
appeals to interpret what level of intent, if any, is needed to sustain a
misdemeanor conviction of the MBTA. Indeed, the lack of any intent
language in the misdemeanor portion of the MBTA makes the resolution
of this issue difficult. These cases emphasize that a clear interpretation of
the MBTA’s criminal liability must emerge to provide clarity and
consistency for those navigating the turbulent waters of current MBTA
jurisprudence. The next section will outline effective arguments away
from a strict liability reading of the MBTA and suggest that courts should
hold misdemeanor offenses under the MBTA require intent in order to
sustain a conviction.
IV. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION LIMITING THE MBTA TO
INTENTIONAL TAKES
The current split of opinion among the U.S. courts of appeals on the
proper interpretation of the criminal liability under the MBTA could make
the issue ripe for Supreme Court consideration.134 If the Supreme Court
130. Id.
131. See id. at 908 (affirming the conviction because “FMC engaged in an activity involving the
manufactur[ing] of a highly toxic chemical; and FMC failed to prevent this chemical from escaping
into the pond and killing the birds[, which] is sufficient to impose strict liability on FMC”).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Sarah Orr & Jennifer Roy, Court Limits Migratory Bird Treaty Act Applicability to
Incidental Take, LATHAM’S CLEAN ENERGY L. REP. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.cleanenergy
lawreport.com/environmental-and-approvals/court-limits-migratory-bird-treaty-act-applicability-toincidental-take/ [https://perma.cc/NM3G-6JSS] (explaining that, because of the recent split among
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heard a case on the scope of criminal liability under the MBTA, the Court
would likely have to decide the significant question of whether actions that
result in the death of migratory birds must be intentional, or whether an
incidental take conviction is available under the MBTA.
In this Section, I explore the arguments in favor of requiring an
incidental take: the need for clear judicial interpretation of this provision
due to changing executive branch views on the issue; the common law
definition of a “take”; the impracticality of a strict liability reading of a
“take” in the MBTA context; and Congress’s original intent in drafting the
MBTA and the sufficiency of its current language.
A. Executive Branch Discretion in Prosecuting Incidental Take Cases
One argument proffered by proponents of a strict liability reading of the
MBTA—including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—is that the federal
executive branch interpretation of the MBTA coupled with prosecutorial
discretion is a solution to the uncertainty surrounding the MBTA’s intent
language.135 It is true that the Department of the Interior investigators
who look into migratory bird deaths—and the U.S. Attorneys who
ultimately carry out the prosecution of the offenses—retain great
discretion in deciding what cases will be brought for an indictment and
prosecution.136 But relying on the decisions of executive branch
employees and their politically-appointed supervisors is not a sustainable
solution for companies and the public who are at the mercy of the federal
government. The taking of migratory birds—both intentional and
incidental—must be governed by clear lines with firm boundaries.

the U.S. courts of appeals, there is a possibility the Supreme Court will consider a case that addresses
the MBTA intent issue).
135. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 902 (“As stated in one of the early decisions under the Act,
‘[a]n innocent technical violation on the part of any defendant can be taken care of by the imposition
of a small or nominal fine.’ Such situations properly can be left to the sound discretion of
prosecutors and the courts.” (quoting United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D.
Ky. 1939))). But see Chris Clarke, Expert: There’s a Problem with Fish and Wildlife’s Enforcement of Bird
Law, KCET (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.kcet.org/redefine/expert-theres-a-problem-with-fish-andwildlifes-enforcement-of-bird-law [https://perma.cc/W7DA-UM8E] (discussing the challenges
posed by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife’s broad MBTA discretion and the use of prosecutorial discretion
“as a stick to persuade industry to comply with voluntary bird protection guidelines”).
136. See Ogden, supra note 74, at 1 (arguing inconsistencies in U.S. Fish & Wildlife
prosecutorial discretion in MBTA cases has led to “legal uncertainty for potential violators, lack of
universal compliance with the voluntary guidelines, and steadily escalating bird deaths” among other
issues).
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The U.S. Department of the Interior adopted markedly different
interpretations of the MBTA’s extension to incidental takes over the last
decade. Under the Obama Administration, the Department of the Interior
pursued prosecutions against private companies for incidental takes, such
as those described in the cases supra.137 This approach was rooted in the
Department’s interpretation of the MBTA, which found incidental takes
within the scope of the MBTA’s criminal liability.138 In a January 10,
2017, memorandum, then-Solicitor of the Department of the Interior,
Hilary Tompkins, stated unequivocally, “The MBTA’s prohibitions on
taking and killing migratory birds apply broadly to any activity, subject to
the limits of proximate causation, and are not limited to certain factual
contexts.”139 In December of 2017—less than a year after President
Trump took office—the Trump Administration’s Department of the
Interior changed course and ended prosecutions under the MBTA for
incidental takes.
In a lengthy memorandum from the new Solicitor of the U.S.
Department of the Interior, Daniel Jorjani, the Solicitor chastised the
application of the MBTA to incidental takes, stating that a prosecution for
an incidental take “hangs the sword of Damocles over a host of otherwise
lawful and productive actions . . . .”140 In this memorandum, the Solicitor
found—relying on similar arguments offered in this Comment—that the
MBTA’s prohibitions on killing migratory birds “apply only to affirmative
actions that have as their purpose the taking or killing of migratory birds,
their nests, or their eggs.”141
The recent Trump Administration’s about-face on MBTA interpretation
is precisely the reason we need judicial clarity in this area of the law. While
it seems that companies and individuals are temporarily safe from
prosecution for incidental takes under the shelter of the Department of the
137. See supra, Section III (discussing prosecutions and convictions stemming from incidental
takings of migratory birds).
138. Memorandum M-37041 from the Solicitor of the U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to the Dir. of
the Fish & Wildlife Serv. 2 (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/02/21/
document_ew_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6U2-LLRM].
139. Id. at 30. The Solicitor reached her conclusion that incidental takes fall within the realm
of MBTA offenses by relying on the statutory construction of the MBTA, the use of the word “kill”
in the statute as a broad term for causing the death of an animal, and that even if the language of the
MBTA is ambiguous, “the best reading of the MBTA is that [the] prohibitions apply to incidental
take.” Id.
140. Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, supra note 77, at 1.
141. Id. at 2.
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Interior’s December 2017 memorandum, a new administration could just
as easily usher in an entirely new interpretation and further expand this
ongoing avian statutory midrash that produces confusion among the
public and the courts.142 A clear and unquestionable reading from the
courts on the proper interpretation of the MBTA is still needed, regardless
of how federal agencies interpret the law.
The mere fact that a federal agency has the ability to choose what cases
to bring or how to interpret the law does not provide sufficient protection
for innocent civilians that incidentally cause the death of a migratory
But more importantly, substituting executive branch
bird.143
interpretation for judicial opinion is a weak foundation on which to build a
body of law governing the protection of migratory birds in the United
States. The law—both the statutory law and the common law—must
provide greater certainty that will outlast the frequent 180-degree shifts
found in executive branch statutory interpretation.144

142. Midrash is a form of Jewish biblical interpretation, which adds an oral tradition to the
reading of the biblical text in the search for truth. See David R. Row, Constitutional Midrash: The
Rabbis’ Solution to Professor Bickel’s Problem, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 543, 555 (1992) (“The Midrash, then, is
an exposition of the [verses] of the Torah which was derived by our Sages after they had probed into
the depths of each [verse] and all the words and letters thereof in search of its true inner meaning.”
(quoting Rabbi Moshe Weissman)); Midrash, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIBLICAL
INTERPRETATIONS, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref:obso/9780199832262.0
01.0001/acref-9780199832262-e-71?rskey=KyFT2T&result=62 [https://perma.cc/UND3-DPDG]
(“The act of interpreting the Bible was an engagement not only with the written word but also with
the practices and beliefs of the Jewish people.”). Legal scholars have compared American courts’
interpretations of the Constitution and legislation to the oral midrash that accompanies and interprets
Jewish written law. See Row, supra note 142, at 555 (comparing the American process of judicial
interpretation of the Constitution and legislation to Rabbinic interpretation of the Torah and
Takkanot).
143. See Andrew W. Minikowski, A Vision or a Waking Dream: Revising the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act to Empower Citizens and Address Modern Threats to Avian Populations, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 152, 165
(2014) (“[O]ne of the commonly proffered solutions to MBTA’s current problems is to simply rely
on the sound prosecutorial discretion of the Department of Justice. However . . . [the] MBTA is
highly vulnerable to selective prosecution and simply deferring to the discretion of the Department
of Justice is unlikely to resolve this issue.” (footnotes omitted)).
144. See John C. Martin et al., The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: An Overview, CROWELL MORING
(Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.crowell.com/files/The-Migratory-Bird-Treaty-Act-An-OverviewCrowell-Moring.pdf [https://perma.cc/N39K-T9AD] (explaining the U.S. Fish & Wildlife’s
approach has historically been “that the public should rely on FWS’s sound exercise of prosecutorial
discretion” in cases involving violations of the MBTA).
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B. The Common Law Definition of a “Take”
The proper interpretation of the provision making it a crime to “take”
an MBTA-protected migratory bird is at the center of the split among the
U.S. courts of appeals.145 As discussed supra, Section 703 of the MBTA
makes the taking of migratory birds unlawful:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided
in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill,
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase,
purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped,
exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be
transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment,
transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg
of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which
consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest,
or egg thereof . . . .146

The most contentious language here is the word “take,” and specifically,
the breadth of liability this word imposes on alleged violators of the
MBTA. The common law history of “taking” language reveals that the
word “take” insinuates deliberate and intentional acts—and thus incidental
takes are incompatible with the common law definition of the word.
The Supreme Court addressed the use of the word “take” in a case with
similar facts and issues as many of the MBTA cases discussed supra. In
Geer v. Connecticut,147 the Court held that “all the animals which can be
taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air—that is to say, wild
The Court’s
animals—belong to those who take them . . . .”148
association of taking wild animals with possession of those wild animals
suggests the use of the word “take”—at least in the common law sense—
implies something more than accidently causing the death of the

145. Compare United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488–89 (5th Cir. 2015)
(“[A] ‘taking’ is limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds.” (citations
omitted)), with United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997) (interpreting Section 703
of the MBTA as not requiring intent or guilty knowledge).
146. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
147. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
148. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
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animal.149 By linking possession to killing, the Supreme Court inferred an
intent requirement into the word “take”—that is, individuals who possess
a dead animal likely intended to kill the animal in order to obtain
possession.150 The possession of an animal further implies the critical
element of intent because an individual does not come into possession of
an animal accidently—possession is the result of a deliberate act.151
Therefore, the common law definition of a “take” is rooted in an
understanding that a taking leads to control, and thus demands a level of
intent on the part of the individual who takes the animal.
Given Greer’s understood common law definition of taking at the time
of the MBTA’s passage in 1918, the U.S. Congress was well aware of the
common law understanding of what classified as a “taking.”152 Further,
as the Fifth Circuit observed in CITGO, the Congress is also well aware of
how to expand liability beyond the common-law definition of a “take” in
the context of wildlife and could have made the conscious effort to do so
in drafting the MBTA, like it did with the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”).153
The Congress passed the Endangered Species Act in 1973, which
“provides for the conservation of species that are endangered or
threatened throughout all or a significant portion of their range.”154 The
ESA defines “take” as interference with wildlife, but expands the
definition of the word beyond the traditional common law definition to

149. See id. (discussing the government’s authority to restrict “the right to reduce animals ferae
naturae to possession[,]” but not mentioning any such authority over accidental acts of capture).
150. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 489 (holding the Supreme Court’s reading of
taking provisions involving wildlife suggests that the word “‘take’ was a well-understood term of art
under the common law when applied to wildlife”). The MBTA was passed less than twenty years
after the Supreme Court decided the Geer case; therefore, the language in the MBTA was selected
based on the Geer interpretation of what the word “take” means under the common law when it
refers to crimes involving wildlife. See id. (relying on Geer in rejecting the argument that “Congress
implicitly intended to vary from the common law meaning [of “take”] in the MBTA”).
151. See id. (acknowledging the link between “taking” and intent because “[o]ne does not
reduce an animal to human control accidently or by omission; he does so affirmatively”).
152. See id. at 490 (stating that unless Congress specifically adds additional language, it is
presumed that Congress was adopting the common law definition and understanding of the words
used in the creation of the statute).
153. See id. (“A simple comparison with related statutes, both enacted fifty or more years later,
shows that Congress well knew how to expand ‘take’ beyond its common law origins to include
accidental or indirect harm to animals.”).
154. Endangered Species Act (ESA), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/ [https://perma.cc/3N7Q-W9C9].
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include actions such as “harass” and “harm.”155 The definition of “take”
in the ESA demonstrates the Congress’s understanding of the common
law definition of a take and its desire for the word to incorporate
negligence and omission, which were previously not included as part of the
common law definition of “take.”156 The Congress’s deliberate use of the
word “take” in wildlife protection statutes suggests that any statute which
fails to include explicit language that expands the definition of a take
beyond its common law definition, must be read narrowly as only a
prohibition on the purposeful taking of wildlife.157 The common law
history of the Congress’s use of a “take” supports an argument away from
a strict liability reading of the MBTA and toward a reading that requires
intent to sustain a conviction.
C. The Impracticability of Extending the MBTA to Incidental Takes
Perhaps the simplest yet most persuasive argument against a strict
liability reading of the MBTA is the negative effect such a reading would
have on American individuals and companies. The result of a strict
liability reading of the MBTA would likely have a detrimental and
unintended effect on industries that play an important role in this
country’s economy. A strict liability reading of the MBTA would run
against the spirit of the statute—to protect this country’s precious
migratory bird population from those who seek to kill and traffic these
birds.158
155. See United States v. 1,000 Raw Skins of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare, No. CV-88-3476,
1991 WL 41774, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1991) (noting the Ninth Circuit had previously held that
“the application of strict liability in wildlife forfeiture actions is necessary to effect Congressional
intent” and advocating such a reading should be applied to cases involving violations of the ESA)
(quoting United States v. Fifty-Three Electus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1982))).
156. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708
(1995) (holding Congress specifically intended for liability under the Endangered Species Act to
encompass incidental harm to wildlife, including “significant habitat modification or degradation that
actually kills or injures wildlife”). The Supreme Court’s holding here suggests that the ESA’s explicit
language, which brought actions that harass wildlife within the scope of the ESA, was a deliberate
expansion of the definition of a “taking” beyond previously understood interpretations of the word.
See id. at 701 (effectuating Congress’ intent in amending the ESA by recognizing the broadened scope
of what a “taking” may entail under the amended statute).
157. See CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 490 (holding due to “[t]he absence from the
MBTA of terms like ‘harm’ or ‘harass’, or any other language signaling Congress’s intent to modify
the common law definition supports reading ‘take’ to assume its common law meaning”).
158. See Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding the language in the MBTA, specifically “take” and “kill”, refer to activities committed by
hunters and poachers—individuals that kill migratory birds for sport or for commercial purposes).
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The effect of a strict liability reading of the MBTA on the public would
be outrageous.
Consider the fictional scenario the Fifth Circuit
hypothesized in the CITGO case of an elderly woman who unintentionally
runs over a migratory bird in her car.159 In a system operating with a
strict liability reading of the MBTA, this woman could be indicted,
convicted, and sentenced to jail for accidentally killing a migratory bird
with her car, without any intent to harm the bird. It is hard to imagine this
was the MBTA’s drafters’ intent when crafting the MBTA.
A strict liability reading of the MBTA would also have an unfortunate
effect on this country’s business and commerce. A common example of
how a strict liability reading of the MBTA would affect industry is the
example of wind energy companies that cause the death of migratory birds
through windmills. Wind energy in the United States and across North
America grew exponentially in recent decades, and the industry continues
to play a pivotal role in providing clean and sustainable energy to power
our economy.160 Wind energy companies face the growing danger that,
because of the way wind energy is produced, there is a high likelihood that
a migratory bird will die as a result of the wind turbines.161
Adopting a broad strict liability reading to the MBTA would lead to
unfortunate consequences for the growing wind energy production that
159. E.g., CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493 (using the example of an individual “whose
car accidently collided with the bird” and observing that an individual in such a circumstance “has
committed no act ‘taking’ the bird for which he could be held strictly liable”). Here, the Fifth Circuit
uses the analogy of running over a bird in a car to point out the danger of reading a strict liability
interpretation into the MBTA. Id. This scenario, as the Fifth Circuit observes, distinguishes
intentional actions of taking migratory birds from incidental takings—an important distinction that is
“inherent in the nature of the word ‘taking’ and reveal[s] the strict liability argument as a nonsequitur.” Id.
160. See generally Jeff Brady, Wind Power Continues Steady Growth Across the U.S.,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 21, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/
12/21/460527376/wind-power-continues-steady-growth-across-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/WF85EPCB] (discussing the recent growth of the wind energy industry in the United States, specifically
noting that as of the end of 2015, there are in excess of “50,000 wind turbines [in forty] states and
Puerto Rico”).
161. See Scott W. Brunner, The Prosecutor’s Vulture: Inconsistent MBTA Prosecution, Its Clash with
Wind Farms, and How to Fix It, 3 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (2013) (arguing that although wind
energy provides many benefits to the environment, often times the nature of the production of wind
can lead to significant avian deaths); see also Bird Collisions, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY,
https://abcbirds.org/threat/bird-strikes/ [https://perma.cc/X5TX-AXJP] (stating wind “turbines
killed nearly 600,000 birds in 2012, from Golden Eagles to migratory songbirds” and warning “[b]y
2030 . . . a [ten]-fold increase in turbines is expected to boost annual bird mortality to 1.4 to 2
million[, and h]undreds of thousands or millions more could be killed by collisions with the
associated power lines and towers being built to carry electrical energy into the grid”).
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stands as an effective alternative to traditional energy resources in the
United States.162 If wind energy companies were widely prosecuted and
held criminally liable for the incidental taking of migratory birds under the
MBTA, these companies would face a tremendous amount of uncertainty
in the possible expenses that would accompany an unforeseen death of a
migratory bird as the result of wind energy production.163
Wind energy is one example of an important U.S. industry that would
likely face substantial uncertainty and potentially catastrophic fines and
penalties if a strict liability reading of the MBTA was adopted across the
United States.164 There are many companies that operate in other areas of
the U.S. economy that could also face steep fines and penalties in the wake
of a strict liability interpretation of the MBTA.165 It is thus important to
consider the scope of how a strict liability reading of the MBTA would
span to many industries, and ultimately result in a great expenditure of
time, effort, and resources to prosecute defendants lacking any intent to
harm or kill migratory birds.

162. See Soumya Karlamangla, Energy Company to Pay $1 Million in Wind Turbine Eagle Deaths,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/24/nation/la-na-nn-windenergy-eagle-death-20131123 [https://perma.cc/7WEF-AET4] (“In the first case of its kind, a large
energy company has pleaded guilty to killing birds at its large wind turbine farms in Wyoming and has
agreed to pay $1 million as punishment.”).
163. See Brunner, supra note 161, at 21 (“The fact that wind-farm operators have never been
prosecuted for MBTA violations seems to be largely a component of prosecutorial discretion.
Indeed, the overall inconsistent and unpredictable MBTA prosecution of unintentional corporate
actors seems somewhat related to prosecutorial picking and choosing.”); see also Minikowski, supra
note 143, at 165 (stating that in 2013, the Department of Justice prosecuted its first wind farm
MBTA violation case). The slow emergence of prosecutions against wind energy companies for the
taking of migratory birds underscores the danger in allowing federal prosecutors to determine at what
time and what industries are to be prosecuted for violations of the MBTA. The danger of relying on
prosecutorial discretion to ensure the proper interpretation and enforcement of the MBTA—
especially in cases involving industries such as wind energy—reinforces the notion that the solution
to the challenges we face in the MBTA cannot be found by simply relying on the discretion of those
charged with investigating and prosecuting MBTA violations. See id. at 165–66 (suggesting the
danger of selective enforcement could be ameliorated by permitting “citizens and NGOs to privately
enforce civil violations under [the] MBTA via a citizen suit provision”).
164. See Martin et al., supra note 144 (noting oil and gas, utility, and wind energy companies
have been threatened with MBTA prosecutions).
165. See Dave Kolpack, Seven Oil Companies Charged in Deaths of Migratory Birds, NEWSOK
(Aug. 26, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/3598206 [https://perma.cc/8XJE-QX4U]
(reporting on the charges of seven oil companies from Kansas, Texas, North Dakota, and Colorado
that were indicted for misdemeanor violations of the MBTA after dead migratory birds were
discovered inside the companies’ reserve pits).
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The energy and resources of federal investigators and prosecutors that
look into alleged MBTA violations should focus squarely on investigating
and prosecuting pressing threats to American migratory birds, such as
those individuals and entities that intentionally capture or kill migratory
birds. Federal investigators and prosecutors are well-equipped to carry out
this mission, as the MBTA provides sufficient prosecutorial power to
investigate, prosecute, and secure convictions against defendants that kill
migratory birds.166 A strict liability reading of the MBTA is not needed in
order to provide federal prosecutors with the tools needed to successfully
protect migratory birds in the United States.
D. Congress’s Intent and the Sufficiency of the MBTA’s Language
Another argument against a strict liability interpretation of incidental
takings under the MBTA and toward joining the circuit courts that hold
intent is required to sustain a conviction, is that the Congress’s intent in
drafting the statute was not to create a law that extends broad criminal
liability to any entity or individual whose actions incidentally cause the
death of migratory birds.167 Rather, the Congress’s aim in drafting the
MBTA was narrow—to protect migratory bird populations in North
America in compliance with the 1916 treaty and to achieve this goal by
making it a crime to kill or capture migratory birds.168 The MBTA’s
language is sufficient—without a strict liability reading—to allow the
federal government to achieve Congress’s mission.169 In order to
understand the Congress’s intent in drafting the MBTA—and why
Congress’s specific construction points toward an intent requirement
166. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (providing that any Department of
the Interior employee with power to enforce any provision of the Act, has the power, “without
warrant, to arrest any person committing a violation of this subchapter in his presence or view and to
take such person immediately for examination or trial before an officer or court of competent
jurisdiction”).
167. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The definition
[of a taking in the MBTA] describes physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers,
conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.”).
168. See generally Migratory Bird Treaty, supra note 12, at 1702 (stating the goal of the 1916
Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds—
which laid the groundwork for the MBTA—was crafted out of a shared commitment between the
two nations to save migratory birds in North America “from indiscriminate slaughter”).
169. See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (providing an expansive list of unlawful activities, such as
“pursu[ing], hunt[ing], tak[ing], captur[ing], or kill[ing],” which are deemed violative of the MBTA
when carried out against “any migratory bird . . . included in the terms of the conventions between
the United States” and other countries).
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within the statute’s criminal liability—it is necessary to examine the
Congress’s original goal in drafting the MBTA and whether or not the
statute can accomplish that goal without a strict liability reading of what
constitutes the “taking” of a migratory bird.
The purpose of the MBTA is to prohibit the killing and capture of
migratory birds by individuals—such as poachers and hunters—in order to
ensure the United States maintains a healthy migratory bird population.170
The public policy reasoning behind the statute is couched in the
understanding that migratory birds are important to the United States’
ecosystem, and the protection of these species demands steep penalties for
those that kill or capture migratory birds either for personal gain or for
some other economic benefit.171 There is no room for lax interpretation
of this statute in cases where the actor intentionally kills a migratory bird—
such actions cut to the very essence of why the Congress enacted the
MBTA over one hundred years ago.172 The statute should not be used,
however, as a means to frivolously prosecute individuals or corporations
that have no intention of killing or taking migratory birds. Using the
statute for such a purpose would be a grave misuse of a carefully crafted
statute with a clearly defined purpose and would simultaneously stifle this

170. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (observing the significance of the
MBTA as an important statute to protect against the unlawful killing of migratory birds, and stating
that “[b]ut for the treaty and the statute [(MBTA)] there soon might be no birds for any powers to
deal with”).
171. See generally Migratory Bird Treaty, supra note 12, at 1702 (recognizing a grave need to
protect certain migratory birds that “are either useful to man or harmless” from being hunted or
indiscriminately killed). The Treaty between the United States and Great Britain (on behalf of
Canada) described the importance of migratory birds to the North American continent and discussed
the value these animals add to the continent’s ecosystem:
Whereas, Many of these species are of great value as a source of food or in destroying insects
which are injurious to forests and forage plants on the public domain, as well as to agricultural
crops, in both the United States and Canada, but are nevertheless in danger of extermination
through lack of adequate protection during the nesting season or while on their way to and
from their breeding grounds[.]
Id.
172. See Kristina Rozan, Detailed Discussion on the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ANIMAL LEGAL &
HIST. CTR. (2014), https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-migratory-bird-treaty-act
[https://perma.cc/U8N6-73T7] (discussing the history of legislation that led to the ultimate passage
of the MBTA in 1918). In 1913, the U.S. Congress passed the Weeks-McLean Act, which
represented the “first national wildlife conservation law” and was passed “in response to the rampant
hunting of migratory birds for their feathers . . . .” Id. The Weeks-McLean Act was replaced with
the MBTA when President Wilson signed the MBTA into law in 1918. Id.
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country’s economic growth and lead to the unnecessary expenditure of
federal and state resources on prosecutions that fall outside the scope of
the MBTA.
The context in which the MBTA was crafted—and the ultimate goal the
legislation was designed to achieve—also supports a narrow reading of the
statute. In examining the original purpose and history of the MBTA, it
becomes clear the MBTA evolved out of a shared desire to discourage the
killing of migratory birds and, specifically, the trafficking and sale of such
birds.173 The context of the MBTA’s drafting reveals a particular and
limited aim of the MBTA, which demands an interpretation of the statute
that fits tightly within this purpose.
One of the metrics used to grade the success of the MBTA, since its
passage in 1918, is the extent to which the statute successfully curbs the
trafficking and sale of artifacts, clothing, and accessories made from
migratory bird feathers.174 As discussed above, the work of the Audubon
Society and other early bird conservation movements helped push—and
ultimately enact—government regulations such as the MBTA, which took
aim at hunters, traffickers, and poachers who kill migratory birds to exploit
the birds for commercial purposes.175
During a June 24, 2014, oversight hearing before a congressional
committee, Robert Dreher, the Associate Director of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, was asked about the success of the MBTA since it was
passed in 1918.176 Mr. Dreher stated that conservation laws such as the
MBTA “have been successful both in immediately restricting trade in
wildlife that was decimating the populations of migratory birds . . . [and] in

173. See Migratory Bird Treaty, supra note 12, at 1704 (stating the “international traffic [of]
any birds or eggs at such time, captured, killed, taken, or shipped” will be unlawful). The treaty
between the United States and Great Britain was the framework from which the MBTA was drafted.
The treaty highlighted the trafficking of birds as a specific act the treaty sought to outlaw,
underscoring the shared concern between the United States and Great Britain in 1916 that the
trafficking of migratory birds was a problem the treaty aimed to address.
174. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Plan to Implement a Ban on the Commercial Trade in Elephant
Ivory, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans & Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on Nat. Res.,
113th Cong. 33 (2014) (statement of Robert G. Dreher, Associate Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service) (discussing the success of the MBTA “in creating long-term changes in popular culture and
taste”).
175. History of Audubon and Science-Based Bird Conservation, supra note 25.
176. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Plan to Implement a Ban on the Commercial Trade in Elephant
Ivory, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans & Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 113th
Cong. 33 (2014).
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creating long-term changes in popular culture and taste.”177 Here, Mr.
Dreher underscores the MBTA’s success in curbing the illicit taking and
trading of wild birds, suggesting that the construction of the MBTA was
designed to target poachers and other criminals who illegally prey on wild
animals.178 Mr. Dreher’s testimony points to the MBTA’s original goal—
to prohibit the unlawful taking of migratory birds for trafficking
purposes—and the MBTA’s success in achieving this goal.179 The
original purpose of the MBTA and the methods deployed to gauge the
MBTA’s success, pose a significant challenge to advocates of an MBTA
interpretation that extends liability to incidental takes—a reading that
reaches far beyond the MBTA’s target offenders including poachers,
thieves, and bird traffickers.
One frequently contested issue concerning the Congress’s intent in
drafting the MBTA is whether known interference with migratory bird
habitats constitutes a “take” under the MBTA.180 As the court in United
States v. Brigham Oil and Gas181 noted, the purpose of the MBTA is not to
provide an avenue for the government to proceed with prosecutions
against companies that engage in otherwise lawful commercial activity,
even when that activity interferes with migratory bird habitats.182 This
was indeed the aim of the Endangered Species Act, but was not
177. See id. (statement of Robert G. Dreher, Associate Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service)
(describing the effect of environmental statutes such as the MBTA that help stifle the trading of
animal parts for commercial purposes). The committee hearing in which Mr. Dreher testified dealt
specifically with U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service efforts to crack down on the growing ivory trade. Id. It
is thus expected that Mr. Dreher’s comments about the effectiveness of wildlife regulations would be
discussed within the framework of fighting the illegal taking of animals for the purposes of
trafficking. But, it is important to note that Mr. Dreher praised the MBTA for helping to curb the
trafficking of migratory birds, and thus shedding light on the statute’s original purpose. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (D.N.D. 2012)
(considering a case in which the defendant was charged with taking migratory birds after the birds
died as a result of coming in contact with defendant’s oil reserve pit).
181. United States v. Brigham Oil &Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).
182. See id. at 1205 (challenging the ability of the MBTA to extend to a company that engages
in commercially useful activity, such as that exhibited by the defendant). The court held that the
defendant’s activity—producing oil and gas—was “not the sort of physical conduct engaged in by
hunters and poachers” and further noted that “such activities do not fall under the prohibitions of
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.” Id. at 1211. The court makes the important distinction here that the
criminal actions the MBTA seeks to guard against—those activities commonly committed by hunters
and poachers—are not the same as an oil company’s unintentional actions that could be harmful to
migratory birds. Id.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss4/4

36

Bowen: Avian Jurisprudence and the Protection of Migratory Birds

2018]

COMMENT

873

contemplated in drafting the 1918 MBTA. Prosecuting companies for
commercial activity that may have a negative effect on migratory bird
habitats comes well short of the type of offense the Congress created in
the MBTA.183
The public policy argument for companies to avoid engaging in activity
that negatively impacts this country’s wildlife is certainly important.
Migratory birds and other wild species are critical components of the
North American ecosystem and companies engaged in commercial
activities that indirectly cause the death of migratory birds or bird habitats
should do a better job of limiting their business activities’ impact on
wildlife. It is incumbent on these companies to be leaders in innovative
conservation approaches and partner with conservation groups to help
protect threatened species.184 The reward for the company that takes
such steps would certainly be reaped in the court of public opinion. But
under the MBTA’s current language, a reading of the statute that extends
liability to companies for incidental takes, or for harm to bird habitats, is a
use of the MBTA beyond the statute’s purpose and runs outside a proper
interpretation of the law.185 The MBTA should be narrowly construed
and used solely in a way consistent with the Congress’s intent.
The MBTA’s language exists to hold individuals and entities that
“pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] attempt to take, capture, or kill”

183. Id. at 1213.
184. See PRIVATE LANDS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, TEX. PARKS AND WILDLIFE DEP’T,
VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION PRACTICES (2013) (discussing various voluntary conservation
practices oil and gas companies may engage in to curb the effects of oil production on wildlife). The
pamphlet lists a number of successful voluntary steps outside of federal and state mandated
regulations that oil and gas companies have taken in Texas to protect wildlife in the midst of growing
fossil fuel production. Id. Among the recommendations made by the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department is to ensure “abandoned wells and well sites are properly closed, plugged and
reclaimed”—an especially pertinent step energy companies can take to help protect migratory birds.
Id.
185. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the
specific actions attributed to the word “take” under the statute, such as “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect” and holding these are deliberate actions that hunters and poachers often
engage in, and “conduct [that] was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in
1918”). The Ninth Circuit found that because the actions described under the definition of “take” in
the plain language of the MBTA described intentional actions that, if committed, caused the death of
migratory birds, a strict liability reading of the MBTA is inappropriate. Id. at 303. Further, the Ninth
Circuit held the MBTA fails to mention any language that deals with habitat destruction and
modification, which provides additional evidence that the statute was crafted to target hunters and
poachers that intentionally seek to cause harm to migratory birds protected under the MBTA. Id.
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migratory birds criminally liable for their actions.186 In order to achieve
its goal to protect migratory birds, the MBTA provides sufficient avenues
to achieve its objective.187 If the Congress desires broader liability beyond
the MBTA’s current construction, then the Congress must amend the
statute to bring other actors—such as those who incidentally take
migratory birds or harm avian habitats—within the MBTA’s reach.
The disagreements among the U.S. courts of appeals discussed above
center largely on the proper interpretation of the Congress’s construction
of the MBTA.188 In United States v. FMC Corp., the Second Circuit
decided a case with a very similar fact situation as United States v. Brigham
Oil.189 The Second Circuit found the MBTA’s language insufficiently
vague and instead read a strict liability interpretation into the MBTA that
now persists as the primary issue in the sparring among the U.S. courts of
appeals on the proper interpretation of the MBTA’s criminal liability.190
FMC’s defense focused on the notion that the defendant’s intent under the
statute must be to kill a migratory bird.191 FMC argued it never took a
deliberate act that fit within the contours of the MBTA; instead, the
company argued it was unaware the chemicals discharged into the
retention pond caused the death of migratory birds.192
The Second Circuit rejected FMC’s arguments, and found the company
knowingly discharged hazardous materials into a disposal tank and this was
an affirmative act that caused the death of migratory birds; thus the act fell
within the MBTA’s scope.193 The court, however, declined to view

186. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
187. See Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (holding the interference with a
migratory bird’s habitat does not reach the level of a “taking” pursuant to the MBTA).
188. Compare Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 303 (“We are not free to give words a different
meaning than that which Congress and the Agencies charged with implementing congressional
directives have historically given them under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”), with United States v.
FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) (imposing strict liability and noting Congress
“recognized the important public policy behind protecting migratory birds”).
189. Compare FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907–08 (applying a strict liability interpretation and
holding a company engaged in the business of manufacturing chemicals liable for the death of
migratory birds impacted by chemicals that washed into a pond), with Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F.
Supp. 2d at 1211 (expressly finding the “use of reserve pits in commercial oil development is legal,
commercially-useful activity that stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act”).
190. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907 (“[S]trict liability has been deemed to apply in various . . .
situations and also when a person engages in extrahazardous activities.”).
191. Id. at 906.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 906–07.
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FMC’s actions within the context of the MBTA’s statutory construction
and purpose.194 Further, the Second Circuit read into the MBTA a strict
liability component—a key element the MBTA’s drafters elected not to
include when crafting the statute.195 The Second Circuit chose to replace
ambiguity in the MBTA with a strict liability reading—an action that
incorrectly reads the statute in favor of the government, not the
defendant.196
The Second Circuit’s reading of the MBTA stretched the MBTA
beyond the Congress’s intent that formed the backdrop for the
introduction and passage of the MBTA.197 Courts considering cases that
194. See id. at 908 (holding FMC’s failure “to prevent . . . chemical[s] from escaping into the
pond and killing birds . . . is sufficient to impose strict liability”). But see United States v. CITGO
Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 492 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding the action prohibited under the MBTA
is the taking of migratory birds, and even in the absence of explicit mens rea in the statute, a taking “is
not something that is done unknowingly or involuntarily”).
195. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907. The Second Circuit held that it is appropriate to apply the
statute as a strict liability statute due to the fact that no intent language is found in the MBTA:
However, here the statute does not include as an element of the offense “wilfully, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently”; implementation of the statute will involve only relatively minor fines;
Congress recognized the important public policy behind protecting migratory birds; FMC
engaged in an activity involving the manufacture of a highly toxic chemical; and FMC failed to
prevent this chemical from escaping into the pond and killing birds. This is sufficient to impose
strict liability on FMC.
Id. at 908.
196. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (holding in criminal statutes that are
vague, those laws must “be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them”). The Supreme
Court reasoned that in the interest of public policy, individuals should not be held liable “for a
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain or subjected to punishment that is not clearly
prescribed.” Id. The Second Circuit, in dealing with what it viewed as ambiguity in the MBTA,
chose not to read the statute in favor of the defendant, but instead read strict liability language into
the MBTA. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908.
197. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012) (making it a crime to take a
migratory bird). Section 703 of the MBTA contains an extensive list of actions that constitute the
unlawful taking of a migratory bird:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in this subchapter,
it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill,
attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase,
deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for
shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any
such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in
whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
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involve entities or individuals accused of MBTA violations can, and
should, use the MBTA to hold those actors that intentionally kill migratory
birds liable to the fullest extent of the law. But transforming the MBTA
into a strict liability statute that reaches incidental take cases—when there
is no indication this is what the Congress intended—constitutes an
unfortunate expansion of the MBTA beyond the drafters’ intent.198 The
MBTA was established with a clear goal and armed with proper tools to
achieve that goal—a broad reading is unnecessary and does not provide a
more effective mechanism for the MBTA to achieve its mission.
The statutory construction of the MBTA provides sufficient language
for federal prosecutors to successfully bring to justice those individuals
who kill migratory birds.199 A strict and broad interpretation of the
MBTA would extend the reach of the MBTA beyond the Congress’s
intent, and thrust individuals and businesses into the criminal justice
process who lack the critical element of intent to “pursue, hunt, take,
capture, [or] kill” a migratory bird.200

198. The Eighth Circuit observed the limits of the MBTA’s criminal liability due to the
drafters’ intent and understanding of the language they used in writing the statute:
Strict liability may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers. But it would stretch
this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal
prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of
migratory birds. Thus, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that the ambiguous terms “take” and
“kill” in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in
1918.”
Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Seattle
Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991)).
199. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (containing the general language making it a crime to take a migratory
bird); see also id. § 707 (elevating the criminal liability to a felony in cases where the defendant killed
the migratory bird with the purpose of trafficking the bird). The language in Section 703 of the
MBTA provides cause for prosecutors to bring charges against individuals and entities who seek to
harm migratory birds. Id. § 703. Further, the language in Section 707 broadens prosecutorial
authority to permit the prosecution of defendants who engage in the unlawful transportation and
carriage of migratory birds. Id. § 707. Based on the language used by the drafters of the MBTA, it
appears that the goal of the criminal liability imposed under the statute is to prohibit the intentional
and purposeful taking and trafficking of migratory birds. The language comes short of imposing
strict liability for any action that might contribute to the possible death of a migratory bird.
200. Id. § 703(a).
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V. CONCLUSION
Avian conservation efforts in the United States have made significant
strides from the unregulated massacre of the passenger pigeon in the
nineteenth century. Today, we have robust conservation programs across
the fifty states, where concerned citizens, non-profit organizations,
corporations, and the government work together to defend wildlife from
human danger. Our country’s growing commitment to protecting avian
populations is a highlight of American determination and stewardship.
Our government is aware of the value migratory birds contribute to the
ecosystem and is resolute in its protection of individual avian species and
habitats.
The MBTA is indeed an important figure in this American conservation
story. But the need for continual bird conservation measures does not
justify a misapplication of perhaps the most significant piece of federal
legislation in the bird conservation movement’s rich history. It is for this
reason that avian jurisprudence must continue. The proper interpretation
of the MBTA deserves further judicial attention and a final resolution in
favor of a narrow reading of the statute.
In resolving the interpretive dispute plaguing the MBTA, it is critical to
look squarely at the MBTA’s language to understand the extent of the
MBTA’s criminal liability. The MBTA’s plain language renders an
extension of criminal liability to incidental takes incompatible with the
intent of the statute’s drafters. A final disposition from the courts on the
proper interpretation is further needed to provide judicial certainty that
transcends individual executive administrations’ reading of the statute.
Relying on the drastically differing federal agency readings of the MBTA
will only prolong the debate on the MBTA’s reach. The logical end of a
broad MBTA interpretation also proves impractical, as such a reading
would thrust innocent citizens and companies into the criminal justice
system for crimes that lacked the important element of intent. A strict
liability reading of the MBTA that imposes criminal liability to incidental
takes, therefore, stretches the statute beyond the drafters’ intent.
The MBTA was crafted to target the poaching and hunting of migratory
birds—affirmative actions taken with an intent to kill. The MBTA is an
effective statutory tool to achieve this goal and preserve America’s
migratory bird population. Those individuals who take migratory birds in
this country will be brought to justice within the confines of the MBTA; a
broad reading of the MBTA that extends liability to incidental takes will
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not improve the effectiveness or the efficiency of MBTA prosecutions,
nor will it bolster the MBTA’s contribution to the American conservation
movement. It is thus incumbent on U.S. courts of appeals to narrowly
construe their reading of the MBTA to the confines of the statute and not
extend the MBTA’s criminal liability to incidental takes. A narrow reading
of the MBTA will provide clarity and practicality to the public, honor the
MBTA drafters’ intent, and enable the effective and fair administration of
justice.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss4/4

42

